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Modal Revolutions: Friedrich 




One of the many pathways of modernity travels along an intellectual 
trajectory that is increasingly skeptical of and hostile toward the 
concept of necessity, a concept that once played a dominant role in 
metaphysical and ontological thought from the Middle Ages to the 
late eighteenth century. By the early twentieth century, the narrator 
of Musil’s Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften would have us believe that the 
human being is endowed with two fundamental modes of access to the 
world: the sense for reality (Wirklichkeitssinn) and the sense for possibil-
ity (Möglichkeitssinn).1 There is no mention of a sense for necessity, or 
what would otherwise be called a Notwendigkeitssinn. The erosion of the 
force of necessity over the mind opens a space of counter-attraction, 
releasing a gravitational pull toward contingency, or the sense that 
there is nothing necessary as such about the world of the given: all that 
exists could just as well be otherwise.2 Necessity can reappear from time 
MLN 128 (2013): 580–610 © 2013 by The Johns Hopkins University Press
1See Robert Musil, Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften, ed. Adolf Frisé (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 
1981) 16–18.
2The ineluctability of contingency is, of course, not merely a modern discovery; as 
Hannah Arendt discusses in The Life of the Mind, the intertwining of freedom, possibil-
ity, and contingency was acutely perceived already by Duns Scotus, who noted, “at the 
same moment the will has an act of willing, at the same and for the same moment it 
can also have an opposite act of willing.” John Duns Scotus, Contingency and Freedom: 
Lectura I 39, ed. A. Vos Jaczn et. al (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994) 116. See Hannah Arendt, 
The Life of the Mind: Willing, (New York: Harcourt, 1978) 125–146. 
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to time as a second-order logical category, albeit channeled back into 
contingency, in which its central (and seemingly paradoxical) formula 
becomes: the necessity of contingency.3 Necessity as such, however, as 
an integral part of the thickness of experience itself, withdraws into 
the unthinkable. Musil’s text functions as a barometer of this shift. So 
absurd, irrelevant, archaic and patently metaphysical is the modality of 
necessity to this particular self-understanding of the modern subject 
that it cannot even be labeled a conspicuous absence. Necessity has 
simply vanished from the horizon of thought. 
The death knell of necessity as a purely metaphysical category, 
as the ontological ground of a well-organized, divinely sanctioned 
cosmos, begins with Kant’s reinterpretation of modality in the Kritik 
der reinen Vernunft. However, Kant does not dismiss the importance of 
necessity as much as transfer all forms of modality from the realm 
of metaphysical truth to forms of judgment related to the conditions 
of possibility of experience: ontological modality becomes transcen-
dental modality. The functions of modality become translated into 
“moments of thinking in general,” construed as a movement from 
“problematic” possible judgments, to “assertoric” real judgments, and 
finally to a realm of necessity that is inextricably bound up with the 
transcendental scaffolding of the understanding: 
Weil nun hier alles sich gradweise dem Verstande einverleibt, so daß man 
zuvor etwas problematisch urteilt, darauf auch wohl es assertorisch als wahr 
annimmt, endlich als unzertrennlich mit dem Verstande verbunden, d.i. als 
notwendig und apodiktisch behauptet, so kann man diese drei Funktionen 
der Modalität auch so viel Momente des Denkens überhaupt nennen.4
The modality of necessity therefore coincides with the universal valid-
ity of Kant’s own critical philosophy and represents the telos in the 
schema of movements comprising philosophical thought. As it was for 
pre-critical metaphysicians such as Leibniz and Wolff, the necessary is 
still linked to a form of truth, albeit only by reinterpreting modality 
from the perspective of transcendental philosophy and by consider-
ing its relationship to the conditions that make experience possible. 
3Most recently, Quentin Meillassoux has attempted to reconcile necessity and con-
tingency by rehabilitating the concept of the absolute as a mathematically-grounded, 
non-totalizable, thought-independent givenness, e.g., as necessary contingency. See 
Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency (London: 
Continuum, 2008).
4Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Hamburg: Meiner, 1998) 152–53.
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Writing in the wake of Kantian transcendental philosophy, Hegel 
also reinterprets necessity as a form of metadiscursivity, or the logic 
whereby logic itself unfolds. In the Hegelian dialectic, necessity appears 
not as the opposite of contingency, but rather, as a second-order char-
acteristic of the self-organization of spirit that acknowledges, makes 
a space for, and affirms contingency as an integral part of its own 
unfolding.5 Hegel’s philosophy—in each of its various permutations, in 
the Phänomenologie as well as in the Enzyklopädie—nevertheless testifies 
to an abiding dissatisfaction with the formal and empty character of 
Kant’s displacement of necessity to the sphere of the universal a priori 
conceptuality of the understanding. Kant’s interpretation of necessity 
is bloodless, detaching itself from the validity of the lived practices and 
norms embodied by individuals who act within a socially and histori-
cally conditioned world. In contrast, Hegelian necessity describes the 
process through which one may give an account of one’s historical 
moment and, if this account proves successful, ultimately affirm the 
intelligibility of one’s cultural norms. Hegel nevertheless shares with 
Kant the attempt to resuscitate necessity within the horizon of discur-
sive and metadiscursive philosophical argumentation by examining 
the conditions that make possible the specific form and function of 
philosophical discourse itself. In both cases, for Hegel as for Kant, 
necessity refers no longer to a pre-critical metaphysical ontology, 
but to strategies of thinking that make explicit the rationality of the 
norms, categories, and procedures of one’s own conceptual system.6
The fact that necessity as a modal category becomes associated 
either with a pre-critical inaccessible metaphysical absolute or with the 
metadiscursive, self-legitimizing norms and rules of discourse as such, 
may in fact explain its diminution as a category of meaningfulness 
for certain modern conceptions of selfhood. As a mode of percep-
tion that orients or flows into practices, the traditional conception of 
necessity as an experiential category appears all but defunct. For Musil, 
for example, the modern subject seems to look at, or more precisely, 
disregard necessity as a non-element of its own way of being in the 
world. Unlike the ancients—for whom necessity by no means func-
tioned as a guarantor of security or a well-ordered cosmos, but on 
the contrary, was more often associated with a radical lack of control 
5See John W. Burbidge, Hegel’s Systematic Contingency (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2007) 16–47.
6This “metadiscursivity” may of course reveal some higher-order metaphysics, and 
this is the critical point of contention between “metaphysical” and “non-metaphysical” 
readings of Hegel; see Frederick Beiser, Hegel (New York: Routledge, 2005) 6. 
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in the face of the larger operations of fate to whose injunctions one 
had no choice but to submit—the modern subject experiences the 
fleshless modality of necessity as incompatible with the overwhelm-
ing and irrefutable facticity of contingency, instability, and dynamic 
fluidity. The modality of necessity may suppress its fatalistic and 
metaphysical implications but never fully manages to divest itself of 
them; the modalities of reality and possibility, on the other hand, enter 
into the very fabric, both material and spiritual, of the richness and 
complexity of experience. Even when necessity is reconceptualized 
as a metadiscursive principle of organization or as one of the goals 
of “scientific” discourse, as it is for Hegel, its epistemic value derives 
not from its immediacy as a lived experience, but as a modality that 
emerges from reflective acts of cognition. 
And yet, is it true that the necessary as a modal category can by 
definition never enter into the horizon of concrete experience qua 
experience? The question therefore may be raised: is it possible to 
think necessity (just as one may think possibility and reality) not as 
that which governs experience—that is, not as a set of extrinsic or 
intrinsic rules, conditions, or principles of organization, discursive or 
otherwise—but itself as an integral part of the fabric of perception 
that manifests itself in and through human experience? 
At this precise moment of transition in thinking about modality—
one in which, for Kant as for Hegel, necessity becomes reinterpreted 
as a metadiscursive property of conceptual systems rather than a meta-
physical property of the given—there appears a sustained attempt to 
return all forms of modality to the thickness of experience, to regard 
modal cognition not as confined to logical or ontological categories, 
nor as judgments that are evaluated according to a priori conditions 
of possibility, but rather, as an immanent and poetic interweaving of 
thought, sign, and historically concrete time and space. The subject 
of modernity therefore becomes redefined less as a being that pri-
oritizes one modality over another, but as the sum total of its modal 
variations, regressions, realignments, as well as both self-inflicted and 
externally triggered perturbations of its own modal tendencies. Modal-
ity in a state of perpetual fluctuation becomes a critical poetic faculty 
of cognition, one that is continually shaping and being shaped with 
regard to its environment. It is this attempt to think modality in all 
of its permutations—in the shifting texture of the organization and 
disorganization of the mind in the act of grappling with the facticity 
of the material world and with its own ideality—to which we now turn, 
and whose central advocate is the poet Friedrich Hölderlin. 
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II
One of the central features of Hölderlin’s poetry and the specificity 
of its language, above all in the works from 1799–1806, consists in 
the continual and fluctuating modalization of the sensible world. 
Hölderlin’s poetry both presupposes and seeks to produce a thor-
oughly modal subject, one who continually alternates between possi-
bility, reality, and necessity—not as logical categories, but as flows of 
experience, modulations in poetic language, forms of engagement 
and involvement. Modalization refers in this context not merely to 
linguistic operators—können, müssen, sollen, dürfen, wollen—but to the 
way in which language articulates a stance toward the facticity of that 
which it signifies. 
For Hölderlin, the poetic modal subject does not follow a trajectory 
from the possible to the real to the transcendentally or dialectically 
necessary, but rather, moves along an ebb and flow between modali-
ties. The possible, the real, and the necessary, as linguistic attractions 
and cognitive inclinations, become present and intensified in one and 
the same act of poetic cognition. 
Although Hölderlin rejects the notion of a linear modal teleol-
ogy, he does not thereby equate poetic cognition with a chaotic and 
non-differentiated simultaneity of modal experience. At any given 
moment, the emphasis in poetic texture will shift from the facticity 
of the real to the intelligibility of the necessary only to fall back into 
the contingency of the possible; or conversely, out of a mist of pos-
sibilities an order will emerge and condense, one wrested from the 
real by the mind’s ability to connect and separate elements of the 
sensible world and follow the thread of poetic form, and the coher-
ence of the world will suddenly crystallize in a space within which the 
imagination might wander.
In a certain sense, necessity may be regarded as the most poetic of 
the modalities and indexes a singularly aesthetic problem: the prob-
lem of representation. Within the framework of Kantian philosophy, 
natural necessity (e.g. as manifest by laws of causality) is not a possible 
object of experience, and therefore remains just beyond the bounds 
of that which can be represented. One of Hölderlin’s most important 
philosophical meditations, a short fragment undertaken in 1795 in 
the wake of Fichte’s conception of the self-positing absolute ego, 
concerns precisely the necessary conjunction and simultaneous incom-
mensurability of that which cannot be represented—pure identity or 
undifferentiated Being (Seyn)—with the grammar of representation 
itself, or the originary sphere of differences that he calls Judgment 
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(Urtheil). This philosophical text was written on an individual sheet 
of paper, with Seyn appearing on one side and Urtheil on the other, 
thereby enacting an undecidable oscillation between each sphere 
as recto to the other’s verso (and vice versa). Hölderlin includes a 
short excursus on modality in this text, which thus becomes of central 
importance to the paradoxical relation between non-differentiated 
Being and the differentiation of Judgment—a relation that actually 
cannot be expressed as a relation, since absolute Being excludes the 
possibility of relating to something as a distinct or differential entity. 
The question of modality, because it is appended to the section on 
Judgment, seems to arise only in the context of the manner in which 
the subject moves through a system of differences. In this section, 
necessity is associated with “objects of reason” (Gegenstände der Vernunft) 
in a way that explicitly foregrounds the problem of representability. 
It is therefore as if the modality of necessity forms a permeable zone 
linking Being and Judgment: an opening through which the whole-
ness of absolute identity makes itself present within the problematic 
and troubled world of differences. Absolute Being (Seyn) and modal 
necessity (Notwendigkeit) do indeed belong together for Hölderlin 
inasmuch as both constitute representational problems for conscious 
experience and poetic language. Drawing on the Kantian theory of 
modality in the Kritik der Urteilskraft,7 Hölderlin notes that objects of 
reason, or objects that would include inaccessible and supposedly 
metaphysical entities such as the divine itself, never appear “als das, 
was sie seyn sollen im Bewußtseyn” (MA 2: 50),8 and therefore seem 
to be banished to a realm that may never be made fully manifest to 
the mind. In contrast to necessity, “[d]er Begriff der Möglichkeit gilt 
von den Gegenständen des Verstandes, der der Wirklichkeit von den 
Gegenständen der Wahrnehmung und Anschauung” (MA 2: 50), and 
hence do not problematize representation as such. Because necessity 
applies only to objects of reason, it cannot be subsumed under the 
categories of the understanding, nor can it appear as a direct intuition 
or perception. 
And yet, as will be demonstrated in the following section, the prob-
lematic appearance, or more precisely, non-appearance of necessity 
7See Dieter Henrich, Der Grund im Bewußtsein (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1992) 717.
8All citations from Hölderlin, unless otherwise noted, refer to the Münchener Aus-
gabe of his collected works: Friedrich Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, ed. Michael 
Knaupp, vols. 1–3 (Munich: Hanser, 1992). All citations hereafter will be abbreviated 
as MA and will refer to the volume number and page number within this edition. 
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to sensory experience and to the intellect (Verstand) becomes the 
raison d’être of the poetic act for Hölderlin. It is precisely through the 
demand placed on cognition via the modality of necessity that the 
divine or das Göttliche manifests itself or refuses to manifest itself to 
the poetic mind. In other words, because Being is representationally 
excluded from the system of differences, the modality of necessity, as 
something that can make itself felt in the organization of experience, 
functions as a proxy for Being.
This facet of Hölderlin’s poetry is particularly difficult to perceive 
precisely because that which appears most fragmented or most cha-
otic may be reinterpreted as an attempt to intensify and provoke the 
mind’s capacity to make sense of its environment, to construct out of 
apparent contingencies the feeling or evocation of coherence. In one of 
his poetological writings, he refers to the poet as one who “im harmo-
nischen Progreß und Wechsel vor und rükwärts gehe, und [. . .] für 
den Betrachter, auch gefühlten und fühlbaren Zusammenhang und 
Identität im Wechsel der Gegensäze gewinne [. . .]” (MA 2: 87). The 
formal fragmentation of poetic form, according to Hölderlin, therefore 
performs precisely the opposite cognitive function to that outlined 
in Adorno’s attempt to co-opt parataxis as a figure of disjunction or 
disunity. Indeed, Hölderlin’s use of form does not bear witness to 
the falsehood of all attempts at synthesis, but rather, is conceived as a 
perpetual cognitive askesis, a challenge and a stimulant for the poetic 
mind to resignify the trauma of fragmentation—what Hölderlin will 
call the “betrayal” of the divine—as the very mode of appearance of 
truth.9 In the process of modal shifting, Hölderlin’s reinterpretation 
of the sacred comes to light: the process whereby a possibility, a new 
(and hence seemingly contingent) reality is converted poetically into 
a realm of necessary coherence.
The poetic act, however, does not come to an end with the achieve-
ment of this resignification. On the contrary, like a scientific experi-
ment whose truth appears so implausible that it finds itself caught in a 
loop of continual testing, verification, alteration of initial conditions, 
retesting and reverification, poetic consciousness must undo the order 
that it previously secured as valid. The poetic act therefore functions 
as a non-dialectical stimulant of poetic cognition, one that continually 
demands a remodalization of the order that it posits for itself. The act of 
9Adorno notes, “Hölderlin’s method cannot escape antinomies, and in fact, in itself, 
as an assassination attempt on the harmonious work, springs from the work’s antino-
mian nature.” Theodor Adorno, “Parataxis,” in Notes to Literature, vol. 2 (New York: 
Columbia UP, 1991) 138–9.
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remodalization, which returns the appearance of necessary order back 
to the state of contingency from which it emerged, belongs essentially 
to the poetic act, which finds itself caught in an oscillating tension 
(rather than a dialectical progression) between modal intensities. 
III
It is in the context of Hölderlin’s tragic drama Der Tod des Empedokles, 
namely in the transition between his second and third drafts of the 
drama, that Hölderlin turns his attention to modalization as a poeto-
logical doctrine. After Empedokles, the tragic mode liberates itself from 
its confinement within a specific generic form and refers more gener-
ally to a pattern of poetic thought.10 Specifically, for Hölderlin, the 
main movement in tragic thinking undertakes a modal shift from the 
possible to the necessary: the attempt to bind and connect the world 
of the sensible in such a way that the sensible itself is endowed with 
intelligibility, or such that the possible becomes resignified as necessary 
without losing its identity as possibility.11 This operation constitutes 
the source of language’s sacred power, or that which links language to 
the sacred: the ability to generate coherence and intelligibility amidst 
confusion, contingency and danger. The failure to complete this task 
in Empedokles—the drama did, after all, remain a fragment—does not 
so much undermine the validity of this operation as render it all the 
more urgent a task for poetic thought. That Hölderlin emphasized 
the predominance of cognitive acts of binding in tragedy is revealed 
not merely in his later doctrine of tones, in which the tragic has as 
its ground the unifying operation of an “intellectuale Anschauung” 
(MA 2: 104), but also in the theoretical remarks accompanying his 
translations of Sophocles. 
I will return at a later point to Hölderlin’s rethinking of tragic 
necessity. However, before advancing further, it ought to be noted that 
Hölderlin redefines necessity by shifting its frame of reference from a 
10Hölderlin later aligns the “lyric,” “epic,” and “tragic” modes with his doctrine of the 
“alternation of tones” as respectively naive, heroic, and idealistic. Hölderlin speaks of 
the tragic poem as one that performs an “intellectual intuition” or makes present “jene 
Einigkeit mit allem, was lebt” (MA 2: 104). The classic analysis of Hölderlin’s doctrine 
of tones remains Lawrence J. Ryan, Hölderlins Lehre vom Wechsel der Töne (Stuttgart: 
Kohlhammer 1960).
11Stanley Corngold sees one of the central problems of the tragedy in the attempt to 
“detach Empedokles from accidentals.” See Stanley Corngold, “Disowning Contingen-
cies in Hölderlin’s ‘Empedocles,’” in The Solid Letter: Readings of Friedrich Hölderlin, ed. 
Aris Fioretos (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1999) 223. 
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metaphysical ontology to a hermeneutics of intelligibility. Necessity for 
Hölderlin does not refer to objective characteristics of the given world, 
its laws and its determinate configurations, but rather, designates the 
retrospective and provisional construction of coherence by a subject 
faced with a chain of seemingly contingent events. Hölderlin’s most 
concise formulation of necessity may perhaps be found in the closing 
lines of the first version of “Patmos,” namely in the injunction that 
“Der veste Buchstab, und bestehendes gut / Gedeutet” (MA 1: 453). 
The poetic act implicitly presupposes a world whose self-evidence 
has been rendered problematic, one in need of coherence and con-
nectivity, and moreover, one in which the extant order has already 
been destabilized by radical, unpredictable change. In the essay “Das 
untergehende Vaterland,” revolutionary time is thus predicated upon 
a modal intensification of possibility. The possible makes itself felt 
whenever the real loses its hold over the mind, thereby provoking the 
sensation of dissolution: “Aber das Mögliche, welches in die Wirklichkeit 
tritt, indem die Wirklichkeit sich auflöst, diß wirkt, und es bewirkt sowohl 
die Empfindung der Auflösung als die Erinnerung des Aufgelösten” 
(MA 2: 73). The poetic act fuses the immediate facticity of dissolution 
as well as the memory of the lost sense of reality—an act of binding 
between past and present—thereby bringing the disruptive force of 
possibility and the emergence of a new temporal order into one and 
the same cognitive space. Hölderlin calls this poetic stimulation of 
connectivity an “idealistic act of remembrance” (idealische Erinnerung), 
or the “Erklärung und Vereinigung der Lüke und des Contrasts, der 
zwischen dem Neuen und dem Vergangenen stattfindet” (MA 2: 
73–74). Only in the intensification of moments of traumatic dissolu-
tion and the poetic healing of these wounds can the intelligibility 
of novelty appear: radical perturbation can only be reconciled with 
divine order in the cognition of a poetic state in which “bestehend 
wirkliches, reales nichts scheint, und das sich Auflösende im Zustande 
zwischen Seyn und Nicht-Seyn im Nothwendigen begriffen ist” (MA 
2: 73). For Hölderlin, the modality of necessity as a conduit for the 
sacred emerges from semiotic, historico-philosophical, and cognitive 
processes of filling out gaps and connecting particulars at intensified 
points of transition. The poetic act documents and elicits the process 
whereby possibility (an alternative, unstable, and differential contin-
gency) is resignified as a necessity (a coherence of events extending 
over time), thereby holding both seemingly mutually exclusive modal 
domains in a singular tension. 
It is important to stress that the necessity generated by the tragic act 
applies only to the necessity of a disruption occasioned by the influx of 
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possibility into the real. This notion of necessity must be carefully dis-
tinguished from a metaphysical conception of necessity—for example, 
the one articulated by Leibniz—that tends to legitimize that which exists 
and sees in the extant order the harmony of the world in spite of its 
apparent deficiencies. Such a “negative” concept of necessity demands 
the perpetual maintenance of the given, regardless of its problematic 
state. This form of necessity—or the necessary maintenance of facticity 
rather than the necessary disruption of facticity—appears particularly 
pernicious to Hölderlin. The attempt to hold the world in a constant 
state of irresolution rather than draw upon and even provoke a crisis 
in order to effect a higher-order form of intelligibility is a standpoint 
precisely adopted by Empedokles’ nemesis in the third version of Der 
Tod des Empedokles, an opponent who seeks “die Probleme der Zeit auf 
andere, auf negativere Art zu lösen. Zum Helden geboren, ist er nicht 
sowohl geneigt, die Extreme zu vereinigen, als sie zu bändigen, und 
ihre Wechselwirkung an ein Bleibendes und Vestes zu knüpfen [. . . .] 
Seine Tugend ist der Verstand, seine Göttin die Nothwendigkeit” (MA 
1: 877). Empedokles’ enemy—whose heroic necessity, linked with Ver-
stand rather than Vernunft, must be carefully distinguished from tragic 
necessity—seeks to bend the will of the people to the extant form of 
power as it happens to manifest itself. Empedokles, however, seeks 
the intelligibility of total revolution, or radical change in all spheres 
of life—subjective, political, and cultural—and therefore foregrounds 
a correspondingly “positive” conception of necessity, namely one that 
sees disruption and perturbation as part of an emergent order. The 
conception of necessity espoused by Empedokles’ opponent is fatal-
istic and normatively secure, whereas Empedokles’ own conception 
of necessity is revolutionary and normatively disruptive.12
IV
Hölderlin’s understanding of the tragic situation as a condensation of 
modal intensities at a moment of dynamic instability originates with 
the poetic and poetological fragments associated with Der Tod des Empe-
dokles, but it continues to play a role in his translations of Sophocles’ 
12The scholarship on Hölderlin’s relationship to the French Revolution in particular 
is voluminous and has a long tradition, a tradition initiated above all by Pierre Ber-
taux, Hölderlin und die Französische Revolution (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1969). 
However, my claim is not that Hölderlin’s understanding of the tragic is derived from 
the French Revolution, but rather, that Hölderlin attempts to render intelligible the 
grammar of revolution as such, instances of rupture that perturb and initiate processes 
of conceptual and cultural reconfiguration. 
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Oedipus and Antigone in 1803. We will now move to an examination of 
these later remarks, for in them, Hölderlin lays bare the mechanism 
through which tragedy effects a modal transition from possibility to 
necessity while simultaneously maintaining the irreducible openness 
of possibility as such. 
Hölderlin notes that the dynamic instability of the tragic situation 
in Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus and Antigone is produced not merely 
by the unintelligibility of an age to itself, but above all by the social 
trauma of states of transition, shifting norms and values, and contested 
models of political legitimacy. Hölderlin describes such periods as 
“vaterländische Umkehr, wo die ganze Gestalt der Dinge sich ändert” 
(MA 2: 375). Hölderlin’s own Empedokles had similarly adopted this 
conception of tragedy inasmuch as its central dramatic problem arose 
from a transition in forms of power, namely from the priestly class 
and the centralized power of the archon to a more expansive natural 
religion and a republican mode of governance. At such moments of 
transition, the real has become unintelligible, the old gods and norms 
have lost their legitimacy, and signs have become unchained from 
their specific sacred referents: everything seems to float in chaotic 
indeterminacy. Because the link between the sensible and the divine 
has been reduced to zero, there can be no possible semiotic opera-
tion capable of communicating the transcendence of the sacred. It 
is at this precise moment that the originary power of nature appears 
as this indeterminacy at a moment of transition, a situation described 
by Hölderlin as follows: “insofern  aber das Zeichen an sich selbst 
als unbedeutend = 0 gesetzt wird, kann auch das Ursprüngliche, der 
verborgene Grund jeder Natur sich darstellen” (MA 2: 114).
The breakdown of the mediating function of language and the 
suspension of truth at the precise moment of overturning gives rise 
to the conditions that make possible the birth of tragedy, which in 
effect refers to a higher-order representation of the ground of nature. 
However, the conditions of transcendental weightlessness that trigger 
the need for the tragic act must not be confused with the enunciation 
of this act. The tragic speech act in fact seeks an adequate poetic res-
ponse to the terror of disorientation, a situation in which, “wie eines 
Kezergerichtes, als Sprache für eine Welt, wo unter Pest und Sinnes-
verwirrung und allgemein entzündetem Wahrsagergeist, in müßiger 
Zeit, der Gott und der Mensch, damit der Weltlauf keine Lüke hat, 
und das Gedächtniß der Himmlischen nicht ausgehet, in der allvergessenden 
Form der Untreue sich mittheilt, denn göttliche Untreue ist am besten zu 
behalten” (MA 2: 315–16). The a priori of the tragic situation consists 
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first and foremost in an impediment to perception, a situation in which 
the senses are continually deranged and competing forms of power 
render individual and communal orientation impossible. The tragic 
act therefore not only represents the apparent rupture of the divine 
and the human in a deranged sensuality, but also seeks to repair 
this false apparition, correcting the misperception of what appears 
to human beings as the absence of divine immanence in the world. 
For Hölderlin, the link between the divine and the human is never 
fully severed. Rather, these two domains communicate in a code that 
requires its inversion in order to become legible: the divine presences 
itself in the “all-forgetting form of betrayal” (in der allvergessenden Form 
der Untreue). But what is this betrayal, and who is betraying whom?
In fact, there is a double betrayal at work in the tragic situation. 
On the one hand, the tragic hero must “betray” the sacred, that is, 
negate the “old” and no longer legitimate sources of political and 
religious authority. From this betrayal, the tragic hero derives his or 
her revolutionary potential. The tragic hero therefore finds himself 
or herself in the paradoxical situation of being radically inside his 
or her culture, indeed, deeply embodying its innermost inclinations 
and latent possibilities, and yet, outside the culture inasmuch as he or 
she appears as a pariah to an extant system of norms (and hence as 
a “traitor” to these norms). On the other hand, the god betrays the 
human being when the divine as sign is no longer manifest, having 
hidden itself in the chaos, violence, and suffering that intensify at the 
moment of transition. This betrayal also makes possible a revolutionary 
shift, since the norms that govern any particular social configuration 
have, by virtue of this act, been suspended. 
Revolutionary time—or a form of temporality in which all compre-
hension is annulled—is therefore portrayed as a betrayal that inheres 
in time itself: 
In dieser [Zeit] vergißt sich der Mensch, weil er ganz im Moment ist; der 
Gott weil er nichts als Zeit ist; und beides ist untreu, die Zeit, weil sie in 
solchem Momente sich kategorisch wendet, und Anfang und Ende sich 
in ihr schlechterdings nicht reimen läßt; der Mensch, weil er in diesem 
Momente der kategorischen Umkehr folgen muß, hiermit im Folgenden 
schlechterdings nicht dem Anfänglichen gleichen kann. (MA 2: 316) 
Time itself is corrupted when its transparent teleological progression—
”beginning and end” as poetically harmonized or “rhymed”—becomes 
opaque to the participants within the drama as well as to the world-
historical observers attempting to make sense of the unfolding of the 
situation. The corruption of time reveals the essence of the tragic 
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situation as betrayal: as a refusal of the divine to manifest itself in the 
world of appearances as order and as the refusal of the human being 
to accept the legitimacy of the pre-existing order.  
Furthermore, the tragic experience of time and space—that is, a 
betrayal of traditional conceptions of time and space as stable, well-
ordered cognitive capacities—positions Hölderlin’s theory of tragedy 
as an alternative formulation to the Kantian transcendental aesthetic. 
Time itself becomes a condition of possibility of incomprehensibility 
rather than a Kantian form of intuition that makes perception possible. 
Tragedy as a poetic speech act, by taking its point of departure from 
incomprehensibility, in turn produces a metaphysics of poetic form 
designed both to reflect and transform the problematic conditions 
of time and space in the act of its enunciation. Hölderlin frames the 
ruptures and reparations in temporality and cognition as problems 
for poetic figuration, whose dissonances and consonances are philo-
sophically thematized by referring to operations of “harmonization” 
(rhyme) in time, or, as we shall discuss momentarily, a break in time 
that becomes part of poetic temporality, namely, the caesura. 
The tragic hero’s central function is to perfectly embody time at 
the very moment at which it turns, or to become pure revolution. If, 
however, he or she becomes pure time at a moment of revolution 
(Umkehr), the hero in fact becomes pure corruption of time. It is in 
this mode of corruption—as one who is “excluded” from the extant 
norms of governance—that the hero appears to his or her environ-
ment. And yet, in spite of this apparent corruption of time, the tragic 
act is only made possible by the assumption that the divine presences 
itself as absence, and nevertheless remains latent; in the tragic situa-
tion, a second-order realm of the sacred comes to light through the 
dual first-order betrayal of the tragic hero and the god. The hero 
betrays the “particular” sacred (in Empedokles’ case: the old gods, 
the priestly class, the concentration of power in the sovereignty of the 
archon), but in so doing, unleashes a process whereby new gods—new 
norms, new forms of governance, new relations to nature, history, and 
others—are made to appear. 
The tragic hero therefore has a dual function, which one may 
observe in the case of Empedokles. First, the tragic hero must make 
this new configuration of the real appear not as merely contingent, but 
necessary: not merely as that which is publicly intelligible and capable of 
a discursively-anchored and cognitively secure legitimacy (as it would 
be for Hegel), but that which is capable of being experienced as such 
immediately and sensuously in an act of aesthetic cognition. Second, 
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the rupture of the normative order of things, the evacuation of the 
divine and the betrayal of time—e.g. the trauma of the hero’s destiny, 
the monstrous sacrifice—must also appear as necessary. The semiotics 
of the tragic hero signals the necessity of a void within the turning 
of time. The function of Hölderlin’s tragic hero is therefore to carve 
out a space in which an alternative normative organization of reality is 
not only thinkable, but is experienced as a necessary rupture that binds 
together subjects, words, and deeds in a new form of intelligibility. 
V
As Hölderlin’s philosophy of tragedy evolves, he believes that in order 
to resignify corrupted time as sacred time, or to produce from contin-
gent possibilities the appearance of an intelligible necessity, the mind 
requires space in order to generate connections and stimulate proce-
dures of binding. This space takes the rhetorical and philosophical 
form of the caesura.13 Hölderlin’s caesura must neither be regarded as 
a principle of disruption or interruption for its own sake, nor strictly 
speaking as a rhetorical technique, but rather, as a nexus of text and 
consciousness that opens possibilities of thought, a space in which 
modal transitions—above all a permeability between the modalities of 
possibility, reality, and necessity—are concretized in poetic cognition. 
As part of the operation of idealistic memory, the repairing of cor-
rupted time necessitates a resignification of what Hölderlin refers to 
as the movement of “transport”: “Der tragische Transport ist nemlich 
leer, und der ungebundenste” (MA 2: 310). The transport designates 
a crossing over, a movement from one state to another. On the one 
hand, the transport is undertaken by the tragic hero when he or she 
13Here I agree with Françoise Dastur’s claim, “La césure permet ainsi l’apparition 
du temps lui-même, elle permet un regard sur l’entièreté du temps [. . .]”. Hölderlin, 
le retournement natal (La Versanne: Encre Marine, 1997) 70. Dastur has introduced an 
important revision to the prevalent misunderstanding of the caesura as pure rupture. 
Lacoue-Labarthe, for example, understands the idea of the caesura as a “break” with 
speculative necessity rather than its enabling condition: “the lesson, with respect to 
tragedy, is as clear as can be: the more the tragic is identified with the speculative 
desire for the infinite and the divine, the more tragedy presents it as a casting into 
separation, differentiation, finitude.” Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography: Mimesis, 
Philosophy, Politics, trans. Christopher Fynsk (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1989) 232. 
However, Lacoue-Labarthe is correct inasmuch as the caesura performs this function of 
“overseeing” time itself by opening a space in which opposing and self-differentiating 
modal forms come into contact with one another and then emerge transfigured from 
this co-mingling. 
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moves from the world of the living to the realm of the dead, when 
“die Naturmacht, die tragisch, den Menschen seiner Lebenssphäre, 
dem Mittelpuncte seines innern Lebens in eine andere Welt entrükt 
und in die exzentrische Sphäre der Todten reißt” (MA 2: 311). This is 
the moment when the being of the hero reaches its zero point, effec-
tively becoming a nullity. On the other hand, this very same transport 
is undertaken by the culture at large, at a moment of transition in 
which all norms are cancelled, thereby opening a space for another 
way of organizing the sensible realm. The moment of radical change 
is “empty” and “the most unbounded” inasmuch as the historical 
moment has no apparent communion with an extant normative order, 
neither with the gods nor with any contemporaneous structure of 
political power. Thus, what must be made intelligible in the tragic act 
is the original unintelligibility of tragic transport: the point of death 
as the moment when both the tragic hero and the entire culture 
must rethink themselves and fill the void of pure possibility, which 
they do by transforming the evacuation of the divine from the world 
into an infusion of divine presence into this apparent emptiness. This 
operation is made possible by the caesura: 
Dadurch wird in der rhythmischen Aufeinanderfolge der Vorstellungen, 
worinn der Transport sich darstellt, das, was man im Sylbenmaaße Cäsur 
heißt, das reine Wort, die gegenrhythmische Unterbrechung nothwendig, 
um nemlich dem reißenden Wechsel der Vorstellungen, auf seinem Sum-
mum, so zu begegnen, daß alsdann nicht mehr der Wechsel der Vorstellung, 
sondern die Vorstellung selber erscheint. (MA 2.310)
The caesura does not merely produce a rupture or a break; on the 
contrary, its physiological and poetic function is closer to the act of 
taking a breath, a making room for the emergence of order amidst 
the rush of phenomena. What appears in the space of the caesura is 
not the alternation of ways of thinking, but thought itself qua idea (Vor-
stellung), indeed language itself, the logos both as word and as intel-
ligibility of the given (“das reine Wort”).14 It would perhaps be better 
to conceptualize the caesura as a pause rather than as an absolute 
14This is how Hölderlin interprets Antigone’s naming of Zeus as “the father of time,” 
a god whose central operation consists in reversing the flow from life to death toward 
its opposite, from death to life: “Vater der Zeit oder: Vater der Erde, weil sein Karakter 
ist, der ewigen Tendenz entgegen, das Streben aus dieser Welt in die andre zu kehren 
zu einem Streben aus einer andern Welt in diese” (MA 2: 372). Thus the apparent 
“eccentric” movement of the sensible into some sacred void is in fact revealed as a 
movement from the sacred back into the world of the sensible.
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break: an opening that binds incommensurable moments, conflicting 
modalities and cultural forms, allowing the spirit to grasp the logic of 
phenomena as they unfold over time. 
According to Hölderlin, the speeches of Tiresias in Sophocles’ 
Oedipus Tyrannus and Antigone mark the point of the caesura: an inter-
ruption that allows observers—both the text-internal observers of the 
chorus as well as the text-external observers of the audience—to resig-
nify the chaotic and potentially nihilistic negation of one conception 
of the sacred as the opening up of a space for a new form of sacrality. 
The logic of this transition in fact reveals a higher-order necessity 
through the cognitive process exemplified by Tiresias, who “in den 
Gang des Schiksaals, als Aufseher über die Naturmacht [tritt]”—at a 
moment during which this very Naturmacht demands the transport of 
the hero, or the movement “in die exzentrische Sphäre der Todten” 
(MA 2.310–11). The Sophoclean tragic hero, caught up in a moment 
of suffering, incapable of perceiving the higher-order organization of 
nature and history to which he or she belongs, is counterbalanced by 
Tiresias, one who stands under the modality of necessity as a “custodian 
over the power of nature.” The caesura therefore allows the viewer, 
and presumably the chorus or demos, to experience all modalities at 
once—the potentiality of total revolution (gänzliche Umkehr), the reality 
of concrete tragic suffering as it unfolds in its present state, and the 
“insight” into the necessity of the self-perturbing order of natural and 
historical appearances as its own specific temporal law.
Although Hölderlin comes to the notion of the caesura in the course 
of working through the translations of Sophocles in 1803, it is perhaps 
this rhetorical and cognitive figure that he was seeking in Empedokles 
and whose precise formal and poetic manifestation never quite man-
aged to materialize in the various versions. Specifically, in the third and 
final draft of Empedokles, after Hölderlin has reconceptualized tragedy 
as a form of modal resignification, he introduces a caesura-like element 
into his own tragedy in the form of Empedokles’ former mentor, the 
Egyptian seer Manes.15 As an Egyptian, Manes exists in a liminal space 
that affords him maximum mobility and permeability: he is capable of 
15Andrzej Warminski also portrays Manes as a “caesura.” However, because he under-
stands Vorstellung as the representation of the drama’s own representation (whereas I 
understand it as the cognitive and historical space in which time itself becomes purified 
and contingency may be resignified as necessary), he sees the caesura as a disruptive 
act of self-reflective textual violence rather than as an opening for thought. See An-
drzej Warminski, Readings in Interpretation: Hölderlin, Hegel, Heidegger (Minneapolis: U 
of Minnesota P, 1987) 17–22.
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moving between mutually exclusive sacred paradigms and modalities, 
situated between monotheism and polytheism, possibility and neces-
sity, identity and difference past, present, and future. Manes moves 
between the certainty of knowledge—he says of the sacrifice, “Ich 
wußt es auch / Schon längst voraus, ich hab es dir geweissagt” (MA 
1:  896)—and the uncertainty of possibility, prodding Empedokles to 
confirm and articulate his identity: “O sage, wer du bist! und wer bin 
ich?” (MA 1: 898) As both foreign to the culture and intimate with 
the culture, as one who understands and yet interrupts and delays 
the tragic sacrifice—Empedokles says, “Nun denn! was hältst du es 
noch auf?” (MA 1: 896) and “wenn dir es nicht / Beschieden ist zum 
Eigentum, was nimmst / Und störst du mirs!” (MA 1: 900)—Manes 
takes up a role analogous to the caesura. 
Manes’ disruption of Empedokles’ sacrifice, as a caesura-like figu-
ration, does not merely open a space of pure contingency, but one 
equally saturated with necessity, or more precisely, a space in which 
these two modalities may collide and be thought and felt simulta-
neously. Like Tiresias in Sophoclean tragedy, Manes perceives that 
which conditions the necessity of tragic annihilation and discerns the 
meaning of Empedokles’ sacrifice, namely the process whereby the 
death of the particular is linked to the appearance of the necessary: 
Die Menschen und die Götter söhnt er aus.
Und nahe wieder leben sie, wie vormals, 
und daß, wenn er erschienen ist, der Sohn 
Nicht größer, denn die Eltern sei, und nicht
Der heilge Lebensgeist gefesselt bleibe
Vergessen über ihm, dem Einzigen, 
So lenkt er aus, der Abgott seiner Zeit, 
Zerbricht, er selbst, damit durch reine Hand
Dem Reinen das Nothwendige geschehe, 
Sein eigen Glük [. . . .] (MA 1: 897)
The order of necessity shines only when the contingent particular 
disappears, or more precisely, when the particular only appears as 
particular rather than as an embodiment of the nomos; the institution 
of the law must survive the contingency of the individual being in 
order to be durable. Indeed, Empedokles’ sacrifice in this instance, his 
plunge into the fire of Aetna, does not simply atone for a prior infrac-
tion against divine law (due to either hubris or hamartia, both of which 
played a larger role in the first two versions of the tragedy). Rather, 
it is precisely Empedokles’ embodiment of an alternative natural or 
social order—his identification with divine law—that necessitates his 
death, for this law, by definition, must transcend the mortality of the 
particular individual.
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In the tragic action, catharsis occurs not in the spectators, nor in 
the tragic hero, but rather, through the tragic hero, for it is time and 
nature itself that must be purified: the hero “giebt, was er besaß, dem 
Element, / Das ihn verherrlichte, geläutert wieder” (MA 1: 897). 
The operation enacted by Empedokles’ projected—but ultimately 
unfulfilled—sacrifice nevertheless foregrounds a central performa-
tive contradiction at the heart of Hölderlin’s theory of tragedy: if the 
tragedy is ultimately designed to wean the people from the need for a 
charismatic figure, from an overattachment to an individual being or 
to the flesh of particularity, then the tragedy as a work of art annihi-
lates its own reason for existence, since it can only function precisely 
by valorizing the particularity of the hero.16 The central danger of 
tragic action, indeed its inescapable double bind—that which must 
be avoided and that which the very form of the tragedy necessarily 
instantiates—comes to light in Empedokles’ over-memorialization. Hence, 
as “idol” of his time—as a distorted and yet mimetic reflection of the 
god, an Abgott—Empedokles must become iconoclastic with respect to 
his own particular iconicity. It is this semiotic operation rather than the 
logic of sacrifice that demands Empedokles’ destruction. The inversion 
of the Christian formula whereby word becomes flesh designates the 
presence of the divine in a human being whose flesh must destroy 
itself to become word: das reine Wort. The death of Empedokles recasts 
traumatic self-destruction as a coherent and intelligible event. Manes’ 
dramatic function is therefore to interrupt the action and open a 
space for thinking the interpenetration and flow between disruptive 
possibility and restorative necessity, thereby mediating Empedokles’ 
sacrifice to the community by making it appear as necessary.17 
The final words of Hölderlin’s manuscript focus on Manes’ revelation 
to the people, the demos, of the “final will” of Empedokles’ sacrifice. 
16Corngold draws attention to this paradox when he says, “Finally, when all accidentals 
have been denied, would not the empirical being of the hero, the finite, historical, 
bodily entity, also be instantly drawn up in this vortex of Verläugnungen [denials]?” 
Corngold, “Disowning Contingencies in Hölderlin’s ‘Empedocles,’” 218. 
17Corngold notes that at the conclusion of the play, “History becomes a world-time 
without sacred renewal, a godless time”(Ibid. 236). Corngold is correct, but only in 
the sense that this state of confusion dominates at the end of the first act, not at the 
end of the tragedy as such; it forms part of the trajectory of tragedy, but not its telos. 
Hölderlin’s notes suggest that the tragic action would ultimately resignify this godless 
world of mere appearances, specifically using the Egyptian seer Manes as a mediator. 
The abandonment of the project does not repudiate its animating idea; on the con-
trary, Hölderlin’s later poetry reveals that he never loses sight of the necessity of tragic 
resignification, but continually seeks a poetic form that would respond adequately to 
the challenge that it poses. 
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This revelation takes place during the festival of the Saturnalia: “Des 
Tags darauf am Saturnusfeste, will er ihnen verkünden, was der lezte 
Wille des Empedokles war.”18 On the one hand, the proximity of the 
pagan festival of the Saturnalia to Christmas—taking place in late 
December—places Manes’ revelation in the context of a redemptive 
event. On the other hand, the choice of this festival nevertheless 
foregrounds the mythical structure of patricide and restoration, 
trauma and healing: the celebration of a deity, Saturn, who is him-
self an embodiment of revolutionary time, one whose own order was 
overthrown and ultimately surpassed by a new sacred pantheon. The 
Saturnalia, as a carnivalesque festival of liberation in which the law 
itself was suspended and power relations were inverted, formalizes 
and codifies this suspension and inversion of law as a higher-order 
law.19 The redemptive content of Empedokles manifests itself precisely 
in the necessity—and hence potential retroactive legality—of the 
abrogation of order.
However, the appearance of Manes as caesura in Empedokles does 
not speak the truth of the tragedy as such, but puts his own utterance 
of this truth in a polyphonic relationship to all other utterances and 
perspectives—as represented by the tragic hero himself, by the allies 
and enemies of the tragic hero, and the demos of the chorus. The 
tragedy manifests itself therefore not as a reduction to the purity of 
the word spoken in the space of the caesura, but as a site of conflict 
whose specific semiosis is under permanent investigation. Der Tod des 
Empedokles as dramatic play in fact reveals not the necessity of a superior 
being, nor an onto-theological sacrality, nor a noumenal world behind 
the world of appearances, but rather, the logic of appearances itself, 
a logic whose very nature is to shift modalities, at times appearing as 
the potentiality of novelty, at times as the facticity of the real, and at 
times as the intelligibility of the necessary. And indeed, here we have 
reached the central function of the caesura: not to eliminate modal 
clashes, but to open up a space whereby one mode may pass into 
another, where modalities clash and harmonize, separate and combine, 
differentiate and unite. The caesura semiologically and rhetorically 
effects a cognitively-grounded modal intertwining, the co-presence of 
18Friedrich Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke, ed. D. E. Sattler, vol. 12.1 (Frankfurt am Main: 
Roter Stern, 1985) 525.
19Karl Philipp Moritz notes that during the Saturnalia, “Die Sklaven waren jetzt frei 
[. . . .] Die Herren warteten den Dienern bei der Mahlzeit auf [. . .] der Senat versam-
melte sich an diesen Tagen nicht; die Gerichte feierten; alle Prozesse ruhten [. . .]” Karl 
Philipp Moritz, Anthousa oder Roms Alterthümer (Berlin: Friedrich Mauerer, 1791) 229.
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differentiated modal forms of attunement through which the “pure” 
word appears, since the word in its purity is this very modal impurity. 
The clash of semiotic operations and cognitive modalities as the very 
texture of the sacred is condensed into a formula in the third draft of 
Empedokles. When Empedokles speaks to his disciple Pausanias, asking 
if Pausanias would give his “blood” and his “soul” for Empedokles—
thereby appearing more as Satanic tempter rather than as sacrificial 
redeemer—he issues a word of warning, saying, “Ich bin nicht, der ich 
bin” (MA 1: 892). Empedokles’ words may be read on at least three 
different levels. First, and most evidently, this paradoxical formulation 
distills human transience to a formula: doomed to pass into nothing-
ness, we are not beings that are, and so too must Empedokles’ own 
form of being embrace oblivion.20 On a higher self-reflective level, 
Empedokles’ statement also lays bare the rhetorical and poetological 
logic that makes possible his own tragic textuality: Empedokles must 
simultaneously persist in memory as an agent of universal normative 
reorientation and be forgotten as a concrete particular. His own tragic 
paradox enacts his simultaneous memorialization and oblivion: in 
“not being” the being whose essence it is “to be.” On a third level, 
this statement opens a window onto the very order and disorder of 
tragic sacrality. This conception of the sacred consciously inverts 
the absolute expression of onto-theological being (the notion of a 
transcendent God as creator) epitomized by the explication of God’s 
name in the third book of Moses, portrayed in Luther’s translation 
as “Ich werde sein, der ich sein werde.” Empedokles modifies this 
originary onto-theological definition of the sacred in two ways. First, 
he shifts his own self-understanding into the framework of the pres-
ent—Luther’s translation of the name of God as “I will be that which I 
will be” becomes “I am not that which I am”—anticipating the thought 
in the Anmerkungen zum Oedipus that the tragic hero must become 
the pure condition of time and space. The pure condition of time, 
however, does not refer to a non-differentiated plenitude of being, 
but to a necessary (and hence intelligible) corruption at the heart of 
temporal unfolding. Second, Empedokles introduces a negation into 
this formulation of the divine, revealing divine betrayal—the neces-
sity of tragic suffering, of incomprehensibility as a precondition of 
novelty, of the destabilizing contingency of the world of appearances 
(which are not that which they are)—as part of the fabric of the sacred, 
20Immediately following this passage, Empedokles interprets his own statement in this 
manner: “Ich bin nicht, der ich bin, Pausanias, / Und meines Bleibens ist auf Jahre nicht, 
/ Ein Schimmer nur, der bald vorüber muß, / Im Saitenspiel ein Ton—” (MA 1: 892).
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indeed, as constitutive of its very manifestation. Empedokles (as well 
as his mediator, Manes) therefore fuses the satanic and the divine 
in his formulation of the sacred name: his redemption frames itself 
as temptation, and temptation (as an invitation to transgress extant 
norms) constitutes the precise content of his form of redemption. 
Empedokles’ formula of necessity—which inverts and negates the 
formula of the divine name—therefore brings together the intelligibil-
ity of necessity (as the revelation of the sacred), the presence of the 
real (as a shifting of temporality into the framework of the present), 
as well as the unpredictable negativity of possibility (the principle of 
non-identity as the very structure of the sacred). 
VI
In the tragic mode, modality moves along an axis shifting from possibil-
ity to necessity, and it ends with the following proposition: that which 
is sacred is the necessity of oblivion itself. However, given Hölderlin’s 
emphasis on the fluidity of modalization, it follows that a necessity 
can at any point be undone and re-modalized into a possibility. In 
other poetic forms—above all in lyric rather than tragic poems—the 
pattern of shifting modalities may be inverted, disorganized, or per-
turbed, and the coherence of necessity may find itself returned to a 
state of aporia, contingency, and dynamic instability. For Hölderlin, 
in contrast to Hegel, one never arrives at an equilibrium between the 
shifting modalities of the possible, the real, and the necessary. 
Although never explicitly formulated as such by Hölderlin, one may 
nevertheless discern as a principle of poetic production the notion 
that poetry must continually perturb the order that it generates: cre-
ating a new order, retesting it and disrupting it once more, in short 
continually remodalizing experience in order to maximize cognitive 
effort. One may see such a reversal, for example, in the relationship 
between Hölderlin’s poems “Der Rhein” and “Jezt komme, Feuer!” or 
more precisely, in the divergent poetological functions of the Rhine 
and the Danube. The final gesture of “Der Rhein” addresses Isaac von 
Sinclair, a proxy for the poetic spirit capable of perceiving the divine 
amidst the semiotic overdetermination of day and the equiprimordial 
semiotic indeterminacy of night: 
. . . nimmer ist dir
Verborgen das Lächeln des Herrschers  
Bei Tage, wenn
Es fieberhaft und angekettet das 
Lebendige scheinet oder auch
Bei Nacht, wenn alles gemischt
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Ist ordnungslos und wiederkehrt
Uralte Verwirrung. (MA 1:  348)
Poetic perception, which manages to orient itself amidst the double 
threats of overdetermination (and thus a lack of freedom) and inde-
terminacy (and thus a lack of order), moves in this instance along the 
tragic axis from the problematization of perception to an emergent 
intelligibility. The poem “Jezt komme, Feuer!” (often known as “Der 
Ister”), however, deviates from this trajectory, culminating in regression 
rather than progression. This poem, which exists as a counterpoint to 
“Der Rhein,” returns the lyrical voice to a state of aporia and confu-
sion: “Was aber jener thuet der Strom, / Weis niemand” (MA 1: 477).
This movement of modalization from the necessary to the possible 
does not represent a perversion or a malfunction of the poetic act, 
nor a crisis that remains in a state of mere negative unproductivity, 
but rather, constitutes the very motor of poiesis. Such a poetic principle 
may be illustrated by following the movements of one of Hölderlin’s 
most famous poems, “Hälfte des Lebens.”
Hälfte des Lebens
Mit gelben Birnen hänget
Und voll mit wilden Rosen
Das Land in den See, 
Ihr holden Schwäne, 
Und trunken von Küssen 
Tunkt ihr das Haupt
Ins heilignüchterne Wasser. 
Weh mir, wo nehm‘ ich, wenn 
Es Winter ist, die Blumen, und wo 
Den Sonnenschein, 
Und Schatten der Erde?
Die Mauern stehn
Sprachlos und kalt, im Winde 
Klirren die Fahnen. (MA 1: 445)  
Critics have continually drawn attention to the opposition of the two 
strophes in this poem as a compressed articulation of crisis, whether 
as mid-life crisis, poetic crisis, or philosophical crisis.21 Within this 
21See, for example, Jochen Schmidt, “’Sobria ebrietas’. Hölderlins Hälfte des Lebens,“ 
in Gedichte und Interpretationen. Klassik und Romantik, ed. Wulf Segebrecht (Stuttgart: 
Reclam, 1984). For a nuanced account of the multiple forms of “crisis” in the poem, 
including mid-life and philosophical crises, see Winfried Menninghaus, Hälfte des Lebens: 
Versuch über Hölderlins Poetik (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2005).
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overarching opposition of strophes, the first strophe captures a 
moment at the pinnacle of plenitude, nature at its zenith, forming 
an equilibrium and communion of oppositions: the land, full with 
both fruit and flower, hangs into the lake, swans are drunk with kisses 
while simultaneously cooling the heat of their passion in holy-sober 
(heilignüchtern) water. In this strophe, a nexus of differences—solid-
ity and fluidity, masculinity and femininity, singularity (das Land) 
and plurality (Schwäne), drunkenness and sobriety, immanence and 
transcendence—interpenetrate and harmonize, and both inorganic 
nature (the land) and organic nature (the swans) partake in a ritu-
alistic baptismal purification. Every object finds its complement and 
its fulfillment in another; just as the land gathers together pears and 
roses, just as the water gathers the swans and cools their passion, so 
too does the strophe itself bind together these spheres (the land 
hangs into the lake, das Land in den See) that themselves function as 
binding elements. 
Although the first strophe reconciles oppositions, it is nevertheless 
embedded in a poetic act that holds open an irreconcilable strophic 
difference. In the second strophe, the visible order of nature appears 
as a palpable absence; cultural artifacts and barriers—walls—and the 
limited first-person perspective come into the foreground. The poem 
ends by erecting a discrete space of differentiation, drawing attention 
to walls that are speechless, at once part of and radically other than 
the poetic act that gives voice to this speechlessness.22 The second 
strophe thereby posits a space of irreconcilable difference and thus 
departs from the interpenetration and binding of oppositions char-
acteristic of the first strophe. The second strophe, however, does not 
merely construct itself as an opposition—for example, as a contrast 
to the first strophe—but rather, negates oppositionality as such as a 
recuperative figure: sunshine and shade of the earth, two terms that are 
clearly oppositional, appear precisely as an absence or a problem 
for the poetic consciousness (wo [nehm’ ich] / den Sonnenschein / und 
Schatten der Erde?).23 Nature appears, but only as that which refuses 
to manifest itself, namely as the invisible: the wind, here seemingly 
separated from its frequent figuration as divine pneuma (the “spirit” 
of poetic inspiration), can only reveal itself indexically through the 
22Schmidt calls the silence of the walls “eine exakte Benennung des Unpoetischen.” 
Schmidt, “‘Sobria ebrietas’. Hölderlins Hälfte des Lebens” 264. As I hope to show, this 
very act belongs in its essential nature to poetry, not as crisis, but as part of its mission. 
23Schmidt notes, “in dieser Frage kommt es auf die Harmonie des Einigentgegeng-
esetzten, des Sonnenlichts und des Schattens an, nicht auf Sonnenschein und Schatten 
an sich.” Schmidt, “‘Sobria ebrietas’. Hölderlins Hälfte des Lebens” 258. 
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clack of weathervanes or the flapping of cloth.24 The indexical sign 
points not to a legible order of nature, but to the semantic emptiness 
and chaotic indeterminacy of its own sound: klirren.
The poem ends with two opposing forms of counter-signification, 
each of which problematizes language as an encoding of information 
that may be assimilated to an intelligible order. The speechlessness 
of the walls indicates silence, or the absence of discourse as informa-
tion and the degradation of the walls as a channel for meaningful 
content; the weathervanes (or flags) generate noise, which, on the 
contrary, produce an overabundance of information that renders 
any process of decoding impossible. The poem oscillates between 
the two limit-points of intelligibility: silence as an absence of infor-
mation (the “walls” as figures of differentiation that fail to generate 
meaning), or noise as overabundance of information (the “clack” of 
the weathervanes that fail even to produce legible differentiation). If 
the weathervanes clack, the wind travels not in a straight line, from 
point A to point B, but comes from all directions and leaves in all 
directions, producing a stochastic pattern that frustrates all attempts 
at decoding: a figure, turning upon itself, that revolves in the facticity 
of its own sonic reverberation. 
And yet: in the representation of that which eludes information—or 
rather, in exploring the horizon of what may count as information—
the poem finds its voice. This final indexical sign (die Fahnen) that 
belies its own functionality—rather than laying bare the direction of 
the wind as an organized and invisible presence, it foregrounds direc-
tionlessness as such—nevertheless reveals itself through the iconicity 
of language, through the phonic coincidence between klirren and 
the actual sound of a weathervane. Herder, in his Abhandlung über 
den Ursprung der Sprache, emphasizes the link between the sounds of 
nature and the capacity of the soul to generate language: “Der Baum 
wird der Rauscher, der West Säusler, die Quelle Riesler heißen—da 
liegt ein kleines Wörterbuch fertig, und wartet auf das Gepräge der 
Sprachorgane.”25 The klirren of the weathervane thus both signals a 
symbolic illegibility as well as an almost archaic return to the origin 
of language through an onomatopoetic linguistic mimesis. Accord-
24There is debate in Hölderlin scholarship as to whether the Fahnen refer to weath-
ervanes or flags. Marion Hiller concludes that, in any case, the “[Klirren der Fahnen] 
als Wetterfahnen und Stoffahnen auf einem gestörten Zusammenspiel mit dem Wind 
beruht.” Marion Hiller, “Harmonisch entgegengesetzt”: Zur Darstellung und Darstellbarkeit 
in Hölderlins Poetik um 1800 (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2008) 270. 
25Johann Gottfried Herder, Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache (Christian Fried-
rich Voß: Berlin, 1772) 78. 
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ing to Herder, when the poetic mind struggles to give meaning to 
the sensible world, its first act consists in an attentiveness to sound. 
The return to a distinguishing characteristic of the physical world 
in the language of sound is at the same time a regression to a form 
of speechlessness on the verge of its own potentialization, or rather, 
a return to that moment just before the human being has acquired 
symbolic proficiency. 
The importance of sound as sound—and hence not as a vehicle for 
a higher semantic intelligibility—appears as one of the ways through 
which the necessary order of intelligibility moves back into a space 
of open possibility. It is through sound as sound, for example, that 
the poem makes a transition from the harmony of the first strophe 
toward an evacuation of meaning from the sensible world in the sec-
ond strophe, travelling via a phonetic resonance and an imperfect 
rhyme: from the symbolically charged final word of the first strophe, 
“Wasser,” to the painful expressivity in the first words of the second, 
“Weh mir.” Both utterances contain six letters, although the second 
utterance has driven a wedge between the duplicate consonant of the 
“ss” (from Wasser to Weh mir) and undergone a phonemic and semantic 
inversion. The graphically differential representation of a phonemic 
identity, the identity-in-difference of the double s, falls prey to a form 
of caesura, becoming separated out into two separate phonemes: the 
cry of pain that articulates the self-relation of a poetic speaker.
If the poem culminates in dissonance rather than consonance, it 
does so not as failure or crisis, but rather as a response to a poetic 
task: at a moment of plenitude where all appears to have settled into 
equilibrium, the poetic spirit must plunge itself back into uncertainty. 
The poem therefore performs an inverted poetological cognitive 
operation to the one described by Hölderlin as “idealistic recollec-
tion.” If the primary operation of idealistic recollection fills in gaps 
and explains contrasts, “Hälfte des Lebens” moves in precisely the 
opposite direction, creating a gap (for example, the gap between the 
first and second strophe) and holding it open as an irreconcilable 
bifurcation. At the height of natural plenitude, rather than undertak-
ing an idealistic recollection of the past, the poet performs a poten-
tializing projection into the future, casting the imagination suddenly 
into a winter landscape.26 The poetic act therefore intensifies rather 
26Although, as we shall see, this future is at the same time a second present. Marion 
Hiller notes that although the final lines of the second strophe exhibit a “futurische 
Bedeutung” by virtue of following the phrase “wo nehm’ ich, wenn / Es Winter ist, die 
Blumen,” they nevertheless acquire a quasi-autonomous “präsentische Bedeutung” in 
their poetic execution. Hiller, “Harmonisch entgegengesetzt” 271.
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than reconciles contrasts between one temporal frame and another, 
giving rise to gaps that cannot be “explained away,” but rather, enter 
into the very texture of poetic speech. 
The potentialization of the poetic act therefore moves the plenitude 
of semantic intelligibility back to a state of indeterminacy—and it does 
so precisely by instantiating an inversion of the tragic caesura. That 
is, just as the tragic caesura enables modal shifting along an axis from 
possibility to necessity, the lyric caesura—in this particular case—opens 
up a space of modal blending by inverting this axial directionality. 
And just as the emergence of the new is latent in the dissolution 
of the present in the tragic caesura, so too is the dissolution of the 
present in fact latent within the seeming integrity of the first strophe 
in the lyric caesura. The lyric caesura, although moving in the oppo-
site direction than the tragic caesura, nevertheless leads to a similar 
conclusion, namely: that which is sacred is the necessity of oblivion 
itself. Each of the main figures in the first strophe—the inorganic, 
singular land and the organic, multiple swans—make a downward 
movement that cuts through a surface, generating a pictorial image 
of the rhetorical-figural caesura as—etymologically at least, from the 
verb caedo—that which cuts: the land hangs into the lake, and the swans 
dip their heads into the water.27 The sacrality of the baptismal image 
is thus at the same time the performance of a fall or a descent. This 
cutting gesture, as a prefiguration of the caesura, is then materialized 
in the second strophe, albeit transferred from the semantic realm of 
figuration to the non-semantic rhythms and patterns of poetic form. 
Here it helps to scan the poem and draw attention to certain recur-
rent rhythmic patterns: 
/ ᴗ ᴗ / ᴗ Hälfte des Lebens
ᴗ / ᴗ / ᴗ / ᴗ Mit gelben Birnen hänget
ᴗ / ᴗ / ᴗ / ᴗ Und voll mit wilden Rosen
ᴗ / ᴗ ᴗ / Das Land in den See, 
ᴗ / ᴗ / ᴗ Ihr holden Schwäne, 
ᴗ / ᴗ ᴗ / ᴗ Und trunken von Küssen 
/ ᴗ ᴗ / Tunkt ihr das Haupt
ᴗ / ᴗ / ᴗ ᴗ / ᴗ Ins heilignüchterne Wasser. 
ᴗ / ᴗ / ᴗ / or: / ᴗ ᴗ / ᴗ / or: / / / / ᴗ / Weh mir, wo nehm’ ich, wenn 
ᴗ / ᴗ / ᴗ / ᴗ | ᴗ / Es Winter ist, die Blumen, und wo 
27Menninghaus notes, “Ein solcher potentiell gefährlicher Sog hinab zur spiegelnden 
Seeoberfläche durchwaltet auch die strahlende Präsenz des goldenen Spätsommer- 
oder frühen Herbsttages in Hölderlins Gedicht.” Menninghaus, Hälfte des Lebens 56.
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ᴗ / ᴗ / Den Sonnenschein,
ᴗ / ᴗ ᴗ / ᴗ Und Schatten der Erde?
ᴗ / ᴗ / Die Mauern stehn
/ ᴗ ᴗ / | ᴗ / ᴗ Sprachlos und kalt, im Winde 
/ ᴗ ᴗ / ᴗ Klirren die Fahnen.
A cursory glance at the rhythm reveals an increase in rhythmic inde-
terminacy in the second strophe; the first line of the second strophe 
(Weh mir, wo nehm’ ich, wenn) floats ambiguously in a space of rhythmic 
and metrical possibility rather than in strict formal determinacy. The 
line, with its commas and long vowels, interrupts and distends the flow 
of the poem, producing a counter-rhythmical temporal expansiveness 
that deviates from strict formal regularity. Although this interruption 
already indicates the most significant gesture of the poem—to perturb 
temporal equilibrium, interrupt “normalized time,” and “potentialize” 
temporality itself—one may go further. 
The second strophe includes two rhythmical caesurae that corre-
spond to specific elements of the first strophe, giving rise to a form 
whereby the second strophe may be superimposed over the first, or 
conversely, be read as its latent palimpsest. The first rhythmic caesura 
in the second strophe occurs in the second line after the word “flow-
ers” (Blumen) and corresponds precisely with the second line of the 
first strophe, namely the “wild roses.” The second rhythmic caesura in 
the second strophe occurs after “speechless and cold” (sprachlos und 
kalt), but when superimposed over the first strophe, aligns precisely 
with the descent of the swans’ heads under the water (tunkt ihr das 
Haupt). Indeed, if “im Winde” had been moved to the final line of the 
poem (so that the final line would read Im Winde klirren die Fahnen), 
then the rhythm of the line would have perfectly mirrored the final 
line of the first strophe: Ins heilignüchterne Wasser. As it stands, the 
rhythmic form of the first strophe has been broken up, and a caesura 
has been generated in the second strophe to mark this subterranean 
rhythmic correspondence with the first strophe. The two strophes 
thus do not produce perfect oppositions of one another, but rather, 
form a spectral projection of one another, each making present the 
hidden watermark of the other: a watermark that can only be drawn 
to the surface when looking behind or beyond the written word (a 
semiotic function which, perhaps coincidentally, emerges from the 
erotically charged penetration of the holy-sober water of a lake, there-
fore turning around the textual-material presence of watermarks or 
Wasserzeichen). The poem moves along a current in which the caesurae 
inherent in a seeming equilibrium are drawn out of their latency and 
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made manifest in the second strophe. Plenitude of being appears as 
that which seeks its own downfall, in turn revealing this downfall as 
the latent dynamic inherent in the self-organization of its own sup-
posedly perfect and stable landscape. Here the caesurae permit lyric 
modality to travel in a direction opposed to that of the tragic caesura, 
namely from the intelligibility of necessity to the openness of possibil-
ity and the ineluctable presence of contingency. As in the tragic act, 
the caesura opens a zone of modal intermingling, albeit realized in 
a speech act that moves in the opposite direction.  
The poem therefore short-circuits the dominant ontology otherwise 
sought by Hölderlin, the hen kai pan, or one and all.28 The poem’s most 
radical gesture culminates in a bifurcation of the present: the present of 
the first strophe, “Mit gelben Birnen hänget / [. . .] / Das Land in 
den See,” imaginatively drifts into a second and incommensurable 
present, “Die Mauern stehn / sprachlos und kalt.” At the end of the 
poem, we are incapable of deciding which present the poetic voice 
occupies: the seemingly real present of the first strophe or the imagi-
native present of the second. This bifurcation describes the logic of 
the poem itself, or the movement from a discrete unit of singularity, 
from the totality of life itself, to the generation of a half. The half is 
incommensurable with totality, continually and willfully destabilizing 
it.29 The poem therefore disorganizes systems that seek closure and 
totality by preventing its own symbolic utterance from achieving perfect 
transparency and equilibrium. 
It was well known in antiquity that a symbol, or a symbolon, was con-
structed by two halves of an object that, when put together, made a 
whole that could be recognized as such. In this poem, there are two 
halves, and yet, when added together, one finds not an intelligible 
whole, but remains fixed in the figure of the half: Hälfte des Lebens. We 
have journeyed, but we have not progressed; our vision of life at its 
midpoint—and in fact at every point, since every point can be seen as 
a midpoint once the frames of reference begin to shift—is not total, 
even at the moment of fullness, but always partial, revisable and fragile.
28For a short analysis of the sources Hölderlin draws upon in this formulation and 
the relevance of this idea for Hölderlin’s poetic work, see Max L. Baeumer, “Hölderlin 
und das Hen kai pan,” Monatshefte 59:2 (1967) 131–147.
29Menninghaus also draws attention to the way in which this poem excludes any 
attempt, “des ungeteilten Ganzen habhaft zu werden.” Menninghaus, Hälfte des Lebens 
108. For Menninghaus, the movement of Hölderlin’s poem reveals an asymmetrical 
force field, “in dem der Abwärtssog in einen nicht näher bestimmten Abgrund letz-
tlich stärker ist als das frei suspendierte Hängen in Fülle und Schönheit” (Ibid. 109).
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Such a work does not lay bare poetry in a mode of crisis, but in 
conformity with one of its essential tasks: to continually remodalize 
experience and move intelligibility (as necessity) back into the sphere 
of possibility in order to restore the poetic act to meaningfulness. 
Seen from this point of view, the first strophe with its hanging fruit 
and graceful swans appears not as perfect reconciliation or plenitude, 
but as a form of terror, as a beautiful, dynamic equilibrium that is 
itself a threat: the aestheticization of a looming internal stasis. Wal-
lace Stevens, in “Sunday Morning,” would later describe the threat of 
idyllic perfection in the following manner: 
Is there no change of death in paradise?
Does ripe fruit never fall? Or do the boughs
Hang always heavy in that perfect sky,
Unchanging, yet so like our perishing earth,
With rivers like our own that seek for seas
They never find, the same receding shores
That never touch with inarticulate pang?
Why set the pear upon those river-banks
Or spice the shores with odors of the plum?30 
Hölderlin’s lovely swans, sensuous as they are, evade the stasis of 
Stevens’ transcendent paradise. And yet, the promise of reconcilia-
tion and of perfect equilibrium must always appear to the poet as an 
ambivalent poetic goal. In “Das untergehende Vaterland,” Hölderlin 
describes the perfect idealistic recollection as “ein furchtbarer aber 
göttlicher Traum” (2.73). The ideal recollection—one in which gaps are 
filled out, contrasts are explained, and history is made intelligible—is 
divine, because without this necessity, the poetic act sinks into a mean-
ingless chaos, and the cognitive excitation that it intends to stimulate 
degenerates into directionless and meaningless differentiation. 
And yet: Hölderlin describes this very same act as terrible. Indeed, if 
ever it were to be achieved, the poetic act would itself become super-
fluous and cease to be meaningful. That is, if the poetic act succeeds 
in guaranteeing the necessity of a problematic reality, such a success 
would then render its own act unnecessary, thereby negating its own 
reason for being. In order to avoid this sacred but terrible stasis and 
the self-annihilation of its own act, the real as given through the 
poetic act must be turned against itself, plenitude must be emptied 
30Wallace Stevens, The Collected Poems of Wallace Stevens (New York: Vintage, 1982) 69.
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out, equilibrium must be perturbed, and we must be returned—like 
the weathervanes that clack or flags that wave in every direction—to 
a state of contingency, possibility, and deprivation, a state that indeed 
calls for and beckons yet another poetic act that might perhaps gen-
erate a provisional intelligibility. The poem therefore represents not 
a moment of crisis—although it is coextensive with pain, confusion, 
and loneliness—but maintains itself in the very condition in which 
the desire for poetry itself is generated.31 
Over and against the threat of closure represented by the first stro-
phe, the speaker in “Hälfte des Lebens” provokes the destabilization 
of this moment of plenitude by asking a question—wo nehm’ ich, wenn 
/ Es Winter ist, die Blumen—that only another poetic act can satisfy. 
And in this case, reading backwards, the first strophe—with its wild 
roses, yellow pears, and graceful swans—might even be construed as a 
response to this question. But if this is so, in this response, the ques-
tion is built into the solution yet again as that which follows, and we 
must repeat the poem, ad infinitum. The poem therefore opens up 
the closure performed in idealistic recollection only to once again 
make present a provisional order: an equilibrium that triggers its own 
perturbation. “Hälfte des Lebens” therefore posits the normalization 
of reconciliation as a threat to its own poetic act, choosing instead 
to produce the state from which emerges the need for poetry rather 
than total fulfillment. 
Hölderlin’s poetry nevertheless suggests that although there can 
be no perfectly stable plenitude, it does not follow that necessity 
can only be understood as a failed or “unnecessary” modality, one 
that must be excluded permanently from the horizon of the modern 
subject. For Hölderlin, the modality of necessity as the verification 
of the intelligibility of the sensible world constitutes an essential pre-
condition of the poetic process; without it, the opening of a space 
of contingency would cease to be meaningful; cognitive work would 
spin in an empty vortex of its own making; and the very purpose of 
the poetic act—to exert itself and deploy its powers within the world 
of the sensible—would lose its reason for being. While Hölderlin’s 
poetry may ultimately seek something akin to a second-order con-
ception of necessity as the necessity of contingency in the tragic 
31Menninghaus draws out the importance of this idea for Hölderlin in his analysis 
of the antique conception of eros as implying a lack that cannot—and indeed should 
not—be fully satisfied: “Denn das Fehlen des Fehlens, die Mangellosigkeit einer dauer-
haften Aneignung des Schönen würde nichts zu ‘wünschen’ übriglassen und mit dem 
‘Leiden’ zugleich das ‘Leben’ tilgen.” Menninghaus, Hälfte des Lebens 64–65.
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mode, it does so not as a logical presupposition, but precisely as that 
which must be wrested from poetic agony, from a struggle with its 
particular subject matter, with its own tortured history and its own 
problematic form. The poetic act aims at the necessity of a specific 
contingent particular (e.g. the necessity of the death of the hero or 
the necessity of confusion at a moment of radical change) rather than 
at the necessity of contingency as such. Necessity thus appears not 
as an ontologically stable category that applies indiscriminately and 
equally to all phenomena, but as a precarious and provisional state 
of mind that can—and at times, should—be undone. The subject of 
poetry therefore must be carefully attuned to the perpetual process of 
remodalization, to movements that oscillate between the verification 
and confirmation of our norms and ways of being and the continual 
subjection of this verification to the irreducible openness of possibil-
ity. In the process of opening up our experience to remodalization, 
we expose ourselves to pain and disorientation; we learn to accept 
a return to the very state of uncertainty from which the poetic act 
was supposed to secure us. We are made fragile, and yet, from this 
fragility emerges the peculiar strength of poetic experience, namely, 
that it may at any moment render solid that which dissolves or loosen 
that which binds, resolving itself into a form of hope that affirms the 
elusiveness of its own aspirations.
